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* My thanks go to Dr Alan Dobson for all his constructive advice and to the Harry S. Truman Library
for their generous research scholarship, without which this article would not have been possible.
1 This article does not seek to conceptualize the ‘Special Relationship’ and the term is used throughout
in much the same way that policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic used it at the time of the oil
crisis, i.e. as a broad characterization of Anglo-American relations. However, the reader should be
aware that there is vigorous academic debate, unfortunately beyond the scope of this article, about
what, if anything, has made Anglo-American relations ‘special’. Supporters of the idea of a Special
Relationship point to the remarkable process in the early twentieth century whereby the United States
began peaceably to assume from Britain the role of premier world power. They also stress the
importance to Anglo-American relations of a common language, culture, beliefs, political systems,
and, in some cases, a shared ancestry and Christian ethic. See H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the
United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783–1952) (London, 1954); G. W. Ball, ‘The
“Special Relationship” in Today’s World’; W. E. Leuchtenburg et al., Britain and the United States:
Four Views to Mark the Silver Jubilee (London, 1979), p. 57; C. R. Attlee, ‘Britain and America:
Common Aims, Different Views’, Foreign Affairs, 32 (1953–4), p. 202. Other scholars are more critical
of the concept of a Special Relationship. Donald Cameron Watt has questioned its value and David
The Special Relationship and the
Anglo-Iranian oil crisis, 1950–4*
S T E V E  M A R S H
Abstract. The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of 1950–4 provides an ideal case-study for those
interested in the postwar Anglo-American Special Relationship. This article investigates the
oil crisis with two purposes in mind: first, to demonstrate how Britain and the United States
struggled to adjust their bilateral relations in response to their changing postwar world
positions; second, to show just how crucial both countries perceived the Special Relationship
to be in the early 1950s. This is done by examining the American decision not to pursue a
policy in the Iranian oil crisis that would undermine Britain’s position, despite at times severe
Anglo-American tension. It is concluded that the problems created by the changing balance of
forces within the Special Relationship were mitigated in Iran by a combination of
consanguinity and, more important, the US need for British help in its policy of global
containment. In short, Anglo-American policy-makers perceived sufficient mutual need to
persuade them to actively preserve and develop the Special Relationship.
Introduction
The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of the early 1950s offers numerous avenues of approach
to Anglo-American relations, not least because it was set against a backdrop of
deepening Cold War tensions and spanned changes of administration on both sides
of the Atlantic. This article develops two such avenues. First, it uses the oil crisis to
demonstrate how Britain and the United States struggled to adjust their bilateral
relations in response to their changing postwar world positions. Second, by
examining the American decision not to pursue a policy in Iran that would
undermine Britain, it shows just how crucial both countries perceived the Special
Relationship to be.1
The oil dispute centred on Iranian demands for renegotiation of a concession
granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Difficult commercial negoti-
ations quickly escalated into a major international crisis which struck at the heart of
postwar British concern, finance. Abrogation of the AIOC’s concession would mean
the loss of Britain’s largest single overseas asset; injury to British prestige such that
other countries would be encouraged to follow the Iranian example; severe damage
to Britain’s balance of payments, as Iranian oil was a major dollar saver;2 and
violation of the sanctity of contract and with it the basis of international trade. The
implications were particularly grave because Britain was so dependent on overseas
trade for its solvency and was already struggling to overcome postwar economic
crises, such as the fiasco of sterling convertibility in 1947 and the devaluation of
sterling in 1949.
Britain’s foremost priority in the oil dispute was to protect its economic position.
Without financial solvency it could hope neither to meet its overseas commitments
nor to protect its great-power status. Nor could it preserve the Anglo-American
Special Relationship, which was the cornerstone of Britain’s postwar foreign policy.
The growing disparity between British and American power was making the
partnership ever more difficult to manage and threatened to bring about an
automatic dominance of American views. His Majesty’s Government (HMG) was
anxious to retain its influence in Washington by maintaining a strong element of
mutual need within the Special Relationship. As Deputy Under-Secretary of State,
Sir Roger Makins, concluded: ‘The maintenance of our economic independence is
vital to a healthy Anglo-American relationship. We must strive in every way to avoid
again becoming dependent on direct United States economic support.’3
After some initial hesitancy the Truman administration felt compelled to intervene
in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. It was concerned lest the oil crisis endanger vital oil
supplies to the West, and was anxious to uphold the sanctity of contract as the basis
of international trade. It was also deeply concerned about what it saw as an
increasing Communist threat to the Middle East. It seemed that Iran might succumb
to internal Communist subversion, that Britain’s pursuit of its economic priorities
could further destabilize the Middle East, and that the Soviets might make signi-
ficant advances in a region of growing geostrategic importance.
Throughout the dispute, Anglo-American agreement was maintained concerning
general principles: the sanctity of contract, the importance of stable oil markets, the
threat of Communism, and the economic importance of the AIOC concession. The
British welcomed US involvement, hoping that an Anglo-American understanding
could be reached that would settle the oil dispute and bolster their position
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Reynolds has described it as at least in part a British diplomatic device for buttressing declining
power and prestige. In similar vein, David Owen has described the Special Relationship as a
dangerous intellectual concept which ‘gave us a distorted perception of our power and influence in
the world’. See D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place (Cambridge, 1984); D.
Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second
World War’, International Affairs, 62 (1986), p. 2; D. Owen, ‘Britain and the United States’, in
Leuchtenburg et al., Britain and the United States, p. 63. Still other writers have challenged the entire
notion of Anglo-American relations being ‘special’. For example, Max Beloff has claimed that
‘relations between the USA and Great Britain have been as complex and as variable as between any
other two major powers: now friendly, now hostile, now in alliance, now deeply at odds’. M. Beloff,
‘John Bull and After: Anglo-American Relations’, Encounter, 66 (1986), p. 62.
2 Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/82377, minute by P. E. Ramsbotham, 22 Nov. 1950.
3 PRO, FO 371/90931, Sir Robert Makins, ‘Impressions of America’, 25 May 1951.
throughout the Middle East. However, the two countries were at odds about the
primary objective. Britain was preoccupied with the economic aspect, and the US
with the Communist threat. The resultant tension was heightened by two other
factors. First, the Americans became deeply frustrated on finding themselves trapped
in a dispute in which they lacked the power to enforce a solution and from which
they were unable to extricate themselves. Second, the British suspected that the
Americans intended to usurp their position in Iran and sacrifice Britain’s interests to
Cold War expediency. Indeed, the fact that four years of Anglo-American acrimony
were ended by a consortium arrangement to settle the dispute was not due to any
reconciliation of opposed priorities or assessments. Rather, it was the product of a
temporary coincidence of interests at a time when Britain could obtain an
acceptable economic deal and the Americans had an opportunity to build a client
state under the leadership of the Shah and General Zahedi.
Anglo-American disagreement about priorities in Iran is the subject of the first
part of this article. The second part addresses the question why, given the existence
of sometimes severe Anglo-American friction, the two countries adjusted their
bilateral relations with a view to overcoming their differences and cultivating the
Special Relationship. This is done by analysing why America felt unable to adopt a
policy in Iran which undermined Britain’s position. It is concluded that Anglo-
American policy-makers perceived sufficient mutual need to persuade them to
temper what could be described as the pursuit of a narrow conception of national
interest in favour of preserving the Special Relationship.
Britain and America in the Middle East
Britain does not want Egypt, or wish it for herself any more than a reasonable man who
owned an estate in the north of England and a residence in London would want to own all
the Inns on the Great North Road. All such a man could reasonably require would be that
the inns should be there, that they should be reasonably efficient and ready to supply him
with mutton chops and post-horses whenever he went through.4
Palmerston’s dictum on Egypt is in many ways a timeless encapsulation of
Britain’s attitude towards the whole Middle East. The region formed a land bridge
to three continents and offered control of the sea routes to India and beyond. It was
important, too, because of the Suez Canal, the discovery of oil, and, more recently,
the air landing and transit rights required for inter-continental flights. A range of
commercial interests, such as construction, banking, insurance and mining, also
served to anchor British involvement in the area.
Britain had first competed with Russia for influence in the region, and developed
in the process a network of defensive treaties with Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt.
After World War II its interests in the Middle East were accorded ever-greater
importance. For a nation imbued with a tradition of empire, the setbacks of the war,
withdrawal from Greece, and especially the ‘loss’ of India had been bitter pills to
swallow. Constrained in Europe and with a diminished role in the Far East, Britain
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4 J. Glubb, ‘Britain and the Middle East’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 44 (1957), p. 216.
made the Middle East the focus of its attempts to maintain great-power status. The
war did not have the same disruptive effect on British influence in the Middle East as
in the Far Eastern colonies. Even the ‘loss’ of India, as Darby has observed, does
not appear to have influenced strategic thinking significantly, especially as a
complacent belief in ultimate Indian cooperation lingered in the corridors of
Whitehall.5 British prestige demanded that, as far as possible, traditional control
over the Middle East be maintained, and Britain’s leaders readily concurred that ‘in
peace and in war [it] is an area of cardinal importance to the United Kingdom’.
Particularly for those who wished Britain to operate as an independent power
between the two postwar giants, it was time to ‘transform the barbican of empire,
the Middle East, into its new keep and stronghold, and to develop the resources of
British Africa and south-east Asia for the benefit of the sterling area’.6
The presence of oil reserves reinforced Britain’s determination to retain its
position in the region. They were absolutely vital to the United Kingdom: finan-
cially, strategically, politically, and militarily.7 Any future war effort would depend
upon adequate, accessible, and reliable sources of oil, as did postwar economic
recovery. Britain controlled approximately one-third of the non-Communist world’s
oil produced outside the Middle East, but even this was deemed insufficient for the
kind of industrial expansion required for rearmament and economic reconstruction.
Moreover, oil operations were critical to Britain’s balance of payments. Although
Britain looked to the Empire and the Sterling Area to offset its mounting dollar
shortage, the United States remained a major source of imports. Dollars had to be
found to pay for them, and oil sales were one source. Even more importantly,
sterling oil was a tremendous dollar saver. As early as 1944, it was estimated that
approximately $100 million per year of foreign exchange would have to be found if
Britain failed to exercise control over oil imports. By November 1950 this prediction
had been realized and if Middle Eastern oil were to be lost, then not only would
British dollar earnings fall, but there would also be a further substantial and
damaging dollar drain before refining capacity could be developed elsewhere.
The British were thus intent on protecting their economic interests. They were
convinced, too, that continued dominance in the Middle East was essential to
retaining their great-power status. Nevertheless, they were shrewd enough to recog-
nize that their economic weakness meant that their position in the Middle East
could not be maintained unilaterally. They needed American support. The problem
was to secure it on the right terms. As Sir Maurice Peterson, Head of the Eastern
Department, observed in June 1943: ‘if you ask your neighbour not to light a
bonfire which may catch onto your house, you are not usually regarded as inviting
him to discuss structural alterations in the latter’.8
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5 P. Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68 (London, 1973), ch. 1; J. Darwin, ‘British
Decolonization since 1945: A Pattern or a Puzzle?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,
12 (1984), p. 194.
6 PRO, CAB 129, CP (50)264, paper by Bevin for the Cabinet, 8 Oct. 1950; Reynolds, ‘“Special
Relationship”’, p. 6.
7 Some idea of British reliance on Middle Eastern oil can be gained from oil import figures for
1949/50: £22.1 million worth from Bahrain and Kuwait, £25.4 million worth from Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
and Iran; and just £8.4 million worth from the rest of the world. Figures from Darby, British Defence
Policy, p. 25.
8 Quoted by A. Nachmani, ‘“It is a Matter of Getting the Mixture Right”: Britain’s Post-war Relations
with America in the Middle East’, Journal of Contemporary History, 18 (1983), p. 118.
The type of Anglo-American relationship which London desired was at variance
with that sought by Washington, in both style and substance. In terms of the
character of Anglo-American relations, the British favoured an overt partnership in
the Middle East and elsewhere. They were painfully aware of their ‘demotion from
Protagonist to attendant Lord’ 9 and the consequent need for consanguinity to
counter American power. They wanted a position ‘closely related to the U.S.A., and
yet sufficiently independent of her, to be able to influence American policy in the
directions desired’.10 The maintenance of Britain’s great-power status demanded that
Whitehall secure American assistance and patronage, not least to help HMG in
other elements of its foreign policy such as leadership of the Commonwealth and
Empire. This was an objective shared by the Attlee and Churchill administrations,
even if Churchill’s leadership added more personal gusto to its prosecution. As he
impressed on the Americans, Churchill was determined to ‘re-emphasize the
partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom in world affairs’
and desirous of re-establishing ‘the intimacy which existed between the two govern-
ments during the last war’.11 After the election of Eisenhower, Churchill moved to
rekindle his intimate friendship with the new President and to establish more
exclusive Anglo-American collaboration. As he told Eisenhower: ‘Two is company;
three is hard company; four is a deadlock.’12
The Americans, though, increasingly resisted an overt Anglo-American relation-
ship. They were convinced that the Special Relationship was at its most effective
when underlying broader multilateral arrangements, such as in NATO and the
United Nations. In fact, Eisenhower rated the need to avoid an overt Anglo-
American relationship just as important as the need for Anglo-American study of
common problems, because such a relationship threatened to impair relations with
other powers, notably France, and to restrict American freedom of manoeuvre when
approaching third countries.13 It could also give the impression that the US was
buttressing British colonialism, and this would have grave repercussions in the
psychological battle against Communism, particularly in the Third World. For these
reasons, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations opposed any formaliz-
ation of the Anglo-American consultative machinery.14 The Republicans, in parti-
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9 C. Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations (London, 1964), p. 7.
10 Extract from a Memorandum for the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, Anglo-American
Relations: Present and Future, 22 Apr. 1950, in R. Bullen and M. Pelley (eds.), Documents on British
Policy Overseas, Series 2, vol. 2: The London Conferences, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War
Strategy January–June 1950 (London, 1987), p. 81.
11 Harry S. Truman Library (HST), PSF, box 116, papers prepared for general information, Steering
Group preparation for President and P.M. talks, ‘Approach and objectives for the Churchill talks’,
u.d., p. 1.
12 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDE), Ann Whitman File, International Series, box 18, Churchill
visit Jun. 1954 (3), memo. conv. 26 Jun. 1954, p. 2; box 16, President–Churchill (vol. i), 20 Jan.
1953–28 May 1953 (1), Churchill to Eisenhower, 9 Feb. 1953; folder President–Churchill (vol. ii), 28
May 1953–14 Oct. 1953 (3), Churchill to Eisenhower, 26 Jun. 1953.
13 DDE, Ann Whitmann File, International Series, box 15, Great Britain (3), Eisenhower to Eden, 16
Mar. 1953.
14 HST, Acheson Papers, box 75, folder 1, Princeton Seminar 11–13 Dec. 1953, reel 1, track 2, p. 12;
PSF, box 116, Truman Churchill meetings, Papers prepared for general information, Steering Group
preparation for Pres. and P.M. talks, ‘Approach and objectives for the Churchill talks’, u.d., p. 1.
National Archives Washington (NA), RG 59, box 2769, memo. by R. B. Knight to Matthews,
‘Conversations between President Truman and Mr Churchill—US objectives’, 10 Dec. 1951.
cular, were openly sceptical of Churchill’s preoccupation with ‘summit meetings’,15
and were determined that while there should ‘be many intimate informal contacts
to achieve indispensable harmony’, these ‘decisions should be through normal
channels’.16
The British were to be disappointed, too, with the substance of the Anglo-
American relationship, particularly in the Middle East. The Americans refused to
support passively the wavering British hegemony in the Middle East as the British
Foreign Office wished. The 1944 Culbertson Mission indicated the new American
interest in the region, and under no circumstances would the US recognize it as a
British sphere of influence: ‘it does not follow that we should become a sort of
junior partner to the British, nor that we should be placed in the position of more or
less blindly following the British lead’.17 The Americans resented British dis-
crimination against their economic interests in the region, and significant Anglo-
American tensions developed concerning communications, commercial air transport,
postwar trade, and foreign exchange regulations. The US principle of equal
opportunity dovetailed neatly with American desires to expand trade with the
Middle East; to counter what they saw as the discriminatory British Sterling Area;18
to further the general foreign policy aim of a multilateral trading system; and to
stabilize the Middle Eastern countries against Communism by increasing prosperity
and providing an influx of dollars.
Two specific issues clouded Anglo-American relations in the Middle East with
bitterness and mistrust: Palestine and oil reserves. The erratic nature of US policy
towards Palestine infuriated the British. The Americans also gave offence by the
impetuosity with which they tried to force a settlement and proposed ‘solutions’
which often appeared ill-considered and detrimental to Britain. The crisis provoked
one of the frostiest exchanges ever recorded between a British Prime Minister and
an American President when Truman’s Yom Kippur speech effectively scuttled
British negotiations for a bilateral settlement.19
Oil was perhaps even more troublesome. The two countries agreed about the
broad strategic importance of oil but, when it came to their own respective national
interests, petroleum was a persistent source of suspicion and friction. The problem
was exacerbated by rival oil companies seeking to involve their governments as they
vied for concessions. So sensitive did oil issues become that toward the end of World
War II attempts were made to establish an Anglo-American agreement for the
orderly development of the international petroleum trade.20 It failed, and demands
continued that oil should be exploited even at the expense of serious rifts in Anglo-
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15 DDE, J. F. Dulles Papers 1951–59, box 10, Churchill Eden correspondence 1954 (3), memo. for the
Sec. State from C. W. McCardle, 9 Jul. 1954, p. 2.
16 Ibid., Subject Series, box 8, Classified, memo. by JFD to Eisenhower, 5 Jan. 1953.
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the Middle East, 1944–1945’, Journal of American History, 63 (1976–77), pp. 913–36; Foreign
Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947, vol. 5, memo. by Chief of Division of South Asian
affairs, 5 Nov. 1947, p. 579.
18 For a contemporary defence of the Sterling Area see H. Gaitskell, ‘The Sterling Area’, International
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20 HST, Papers of R. K. Davies, box 13, subject file, Anglo-American oil treaty 1945–47, folder 3,
undated speech.
American relations. For example, Colonel J. H. Leavell, commissioned in October
1943 to provide a basis for an American postwar petroleum policy in Africa and the
Near East, advocated the physical and financial separation of British and American
oil interests and the expansion of US interests at Britain’s expense.21
Thus, Anglo-American relations in the Middle East during the AIOC crisis were
characterized by economic rivalry and the pursuit of different priorities consonant
with each country’s changing world status. The Americans believed that the British
overemphasized economic issues,22 pursued discriminatory trading policies, and
threatened the stability of the region with their antiquated imperialistic attitude
which was a goad to Third World nationalism. The British regarded their American
counterparts as often rash and insensitive, as in the case of Palestine. They were not
sanguine either that the ideological case for the US’s growing involvement in the
area justified its potentially predatory economic presence. Deeply conscious of their
economic weakness, the British struggled to embroil the US in the Middle East and
then struggled to prevent that very involvement from supplanting their interests.
Perhaps the classic analogy was that of Harold Macmillan whereby the British were
the Greeks in the new Roman Empire. ‘You will find the American mind as the
Greeks found the Romans—great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than
we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt’.23 The
British aimed to guide this naive giant,24 but alas the new Romans often proved ill-
disposed to such ‘education’ and resented their teacher’s patronizing attitude and
didactic prescriptions.
Britain and America in Iran
British interest in Iran was long established. In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Iran had been the subject of sharp economic and political rivalry between
Britain and Russia. The British succeeded in expanding their influence rapidly,
particularly with the discovery of oil, the agreement of the D’Arcy oil concession in
1901,25 and the decline of Russian involvement in Iran following the Bolshevik
Revolution. Indeed, by the end of World War II, Iran, and particularly the oil
operations centred on the huge refinery at Abadan (an island at the confluence of
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers), was of major importance to Britain.
AIOC operations in Iran were of vital importance to the British Treasury.
Increased Iranian oil production brought in more revenue;26 conversely, if the AIOC
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23 Cited by M. G. Fry, ‘The Special Relationship’, Review of International Studies, 14 (1988), p. 241.
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(Princeton, NJ, 1956), p. 209.
26 H. Longhurst, Adventure in Oil: The Story of British Petroleum (London, 1959), p. 136.
concession were lost, there would be a substantial and damaging dollar drain in
Europe and devastating repercussions for Britain. The damage would be dis-
proportionately large owing to Britain’s extraordinary dependence on overseas trade,
the enormous size of its investment in Iran, and the fact that the oil was paid for in
dollars and soft currencies.27 As the British noted in spring 1949, if they surrendered
the AIOC concession ‘we should lose our most important single overseas invest-
ment, which makes a vital contribution to our balance of payments, and would be
obliged to accept probably inadequate compensation, which would be paid in the
form of oil deliveries over a limited period of years, after which we would have
nothing’.28
The crisis also threatened British prestige and had strategic implications. The
AIOC was a monument to British enterprise and Abadan was ‘one of the greatest
and most complex industrial undertakings in the world’.29 World War II had also
brought home the military importance of ample and reliable sources of oil,
seemingly vindicating HMG’s decision prior to World War I to purchase a control-
ling share in the company in order to guarantee supplies of oil for the Royal Navy.
Indeed, many believed that the AIOC was an instrument of British policy in Iran. It
certainly protected British oil interests in the Middle East, and Barry Rubin has even
described it as ‘a state within a state’.30
Thus, the AIOC concession held vast symbolic, economic, military, and strategic
importance for Britain’s attempt to retain its great-power status. Things became
extremely tense in May 1951 when Iran’s fiercely nationalistic premier, Muhammad
Mossadeq, nationalized the Iranian assets of the AIOC. Britain resolved that Iran
should not be allowed to get away with such impudence and that this had to be
demonstrated to the world. Economic sanctions and an oil embargo were introduced
to starve the Iranians into surrender. Legal proceedings were instituted to vilify Iran
in international law. Serious consideration was even given to taking military action
against Iran.
However, Britain’s policies depended for success upon an independent variable,
American support. The oil embargo would be unenforceable without the support of
the US government, to which American multinational oil companies looked for
advice. Economic sanctions, too, would be futile if the Americans chose to provide
aid to Iran. Moreover, without an overt Anglo-American approach, Iran would seek
to play the Atlantic partners off against each other and would demand ever more
concessions.
American interest in Iran, as in other Middle Eastern countries, grew in the wake
of World War II. Stalin’s delay in withdrawing Soviet troops from northern Iran
in 1946 provoked an international crisis which saw the US champion Iran’s
independence. US–Iranian agreements thereafter confirmed America’s increasing
influence in, and concern for, Iran: on 6 October 1947 it was agreed to establish a
US military mission; and in September 1948 assistance to the gendarmerie was
renewed and a $10 million credit provided for arms purchases. The onset of the Cold
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War increased American sensitivities about Iran, particularly because of its geo-
strategic position and oil resources.
America’s reaction to HMG’s handling of the oil crisis was in line with its critique
of British Middle Eastern policy generally. The preoccupation of the British with
their economic position meant that they underestimated the threat of Communism.
This was unacceptable. The Americans abhorred the prospect of British military
intervention and effectively vetoed it in the summer of 1951. They also opposed
Britain’s attempt to starve Iran into capitulation, because this could result in losing
Iran to the Soviets. The US was at a loss, too, to understand the myopic refusal of
British officials to make the minor concessions to Iran which the Americans felt
would facilitate a settlement. Moreover, the imperialistic attitude of the British,
particularly within the AIOC, pitted them against Third World nationalism which
the US wanted to harness against Communism.
The British were bitterly disappointed at the attitude of the US, particularly given
their ongoing support of America in the Korean War. They considered the
Americans to be excessively pessimistic about the threat of Communism in Iran,
naive in Middle Eastern affairs and all too prepared to sacrifice the interests of their
primary Cold War ally for the sake of an expedient oil settlement. HMG also
believed that the US failure to provide overt support for the British position
encouraged Iranian recalcitrance and was thus largely responsible for the deepening
crisis. Moreover, America’s sharp criticism and propensity to advance new potential
oil settlements involving ever greater British concessions to Iran raised fears that the
US was manipulating the situation to the advantage of its own oil companies.
Repeated American attempts to assuage such suspicions proved largely ineffective.
The British strove to manipulate the Americans into a position more akin to their
own, with some success, as was reflected in a joint Truman–Churchill proposal in
August 1952 and ultimately a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-inspired coup in
Iran a year later. Whenever the Americans appeared reluctant, the British pro-
crastinated and made minor concessions to keep the Americans in play and prevent
them from adopting an independent policy which would undermine that of HMG.
The British also tried to ensure that the Americans did not take advantage of the oil
crisis to usurp Britain’s position in Iran.
For their part, the Americans aimed to sponsor an oil settlement that would save
Iran from Communism and preserve the sanctity of contract. They attempted to
manoeuvre the British into a more conciliatory stance and to devise an oil scheme
that conformed to the 50:50 profit-sharing precedent established by ARAMCO in
1950. To offer terms better than this threatened to destabilize the world oil markets
upon which the West was so dependent. The US kept urging Britain to make
concessions to appease Iran; unilaterally advanced limited military and financial aid
to Iran; and sought to dissociate itself from the stigma of British imperialism—all
much to British chagrin. So strained did relations become that the Americans
threatened Britain with, and gave serious consideration to, the adoption of a
distinctive policy in Iran, despite all the implications that entailed for the Special
Relationship.31
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Global warmth and mutual dependency
These strains were born primarily of the two countries’ need to adjust their bilateral
relations in accordance with their new world positions. The question therefore is,
why did America refuse to break with Britain over Iran? The answer is twofold.
First, US policy-makers judged the global importance of the Special Relationship to
American interests to be far greater than America’s specific interest in Iran. Second,
they were unwilling to assume responsibility for the Middle East, relying instead
upon Britain to act as guarantor of Middle Eastern security. As a consequence, they
tied their own hands when it came to pushing Britain into making large concessions
in the Iranian oil crisis.
By the end of 1949, US containment policy seemed in jeopardy. China had been
lost to Communism, Communist pressures were growing in Asia, and the Middle
East appeared volatile in the face of rising nationalism and Truman’s sponsorship of
Israel. The US was also experiencing a recession which exacerbated the payments
problems of other nations. This prompted fears of a reversion to autarkic policies,
reduced production, British retrenchment,32 and even a Japanese and German
rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. America’s ability to react to the growing crisis
was limited by, among other things, administrative shortcomings, revelations of
Soviet espionage, and press vilification of Secretary of State Dean Acheson as being
‘soft’ on Communism.33 Most alarming of all was the detection in September 1949
of a Soviet atomic test. This broke the US atomic monopoly and demanded a
reassessment of American strategic plans and political assumptions.
The response was National Security Resolution 68 (NSC 68), brainchild of the
Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze.34 Endorsed by Acheson, Nitze’s
ideas effectively militarized containment, recognized that the US could no longer
afford to be passive and cede the initiative in the Cold War to the Soviet Union, and
shifted the emphasis of containment away from Europe and toward the Third
World. To make these ideas work, America needed allies which, in the long run,
would be strong and basically friendly and share the same fundamental objectives
and values.35
Only Britain fulfilled American prerequisites.36 Cultural and political affinities
remained intact between the US and Britain. Even more importantly, Britain’s
economic and military power and political stability were unequalled by any other
possible ally. In 1949 Britain devoted a greater proportion than even America of its
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national income to defence expenditure,37 and by 1950 British production was two
and a half times that of France and 50 per cent greater than West Germany’s. It also
retained an important economic position at the centre of the Commonwealth and
the Sterling Area and held a vital strategic position in Europe. Furthermore, Anglo-
American friendship would encourage the Commonwealth countries to maintain
their Western orientation. This was doubly important as the Commonwealth could
contribute a ready-made structure to the organization of the ‘Free World’. Indeed,
the US considered the Commonwealth to be of greater political, economic, and
strategic significance than any other existing group.
Consequently, while the range and diversity of British interests were frequently a
source of Anglo-American friction, they also placed Britain in a unique position to
fulfil many US objectives which the Americans lacked the power, influence or desire
to address themselves. In fact, American policy-planners envisaged multiple roles for
Britain: leader of an integrated Western Europe; a principal partner in strategic
planning and intelligence cooperation; the mainstay of the Commonwealth; an
assistant in developing both dependent nations and a multilateral trade system; a
supporter of the United Nations; and a supplier of strategic staging posts and
military bases (especially nuclear ones in Britain itself).38 No other nation could
fulfil these roles. It was believed to be basic to US interests to develop further the
type of relationship which, without formal arrangement, enabled it to station troops
in England and its dependants. As a report in February 1950 concluded: ‘There is
almost no area of the world in which we do not need British help and cooperation.
Every effort should be made to formulate and carry out a common policy in each
area. Such a relationship places the U.K. in a special or preferred position—the facts
of the world situation require it.’ 39
During the London Conferences in April 1950 the British noted of the Americans,
‘It is the first time since the war that they have approached us as a partner on the
most general issues of policy.’40 While there was no hiding the growing disparity of
power between the two, the Communist threat, in particular, restored for the
Americans a sense of mutual dependency and modified the tendency for Anglo-
American collaboration to result in the automatic preponderance of US views. The
‘specialness’ in Anglo-American relations had been renewed, in terms of both
quality and importance. This is reflected in an American military report written in
April 1950: ‘there is and should be a special U.S.–U.K. relationship ... Accordingly
an examination of the relationship is necessary, not to see whether it can be retained
but to see how it can be strengthened.’41
This sense of the overriding importance of the Special Relationship was a
consistent theme on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the Iranian oil crisis. At
the end of 1951 the US still desired ‘to strengthen the relationship and to concert, as
far as possible, U.S.–U.K. policies in order to facilitate the achievement of joint
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objectives’.42 After all, Britain was still contributing more than 40 per cent of the
defence spending of Europe’s NATO members and, in relative terms at least,
remained ‘the rich man in his palace, not yet the poor man at the gate’.43 At talks
between Truman and Churchill in January 1952 both sides took care to cultivate the
relationship at a time of increasing tension over Iran, Formosa, Egypt, European
integration and Korea. Upon assuming office, Eisenhower and Dulles re-emphasized
the importance of the Anglo-American relationship to the survival of the West. In
fact, so strong was this belief in the two countries’ mutual dependency that it was
able to survive even the Suez débâcle:
We rely on British help, both material and psychological, to implement our policies towards
the Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, South Asia and some areas of the Far East. We
recognize that the two acting in concert, with the aid of the Commonwealth, form a more
persuasive combination than the US acting alone. In addition, we rely heavily on Britain in
the military field. Their contribution, next to our own, at present forms the largest national
component in NATO and UK territory affords essential bases for US forces in the British
Isles, the Caribbean and other areas.44
The Middle East revisited: an American perspective
On the global level, then, the strength of the Special Relationship is evident.
However, this did not always inhibit the two countries from pursuing independent
and contradictory policies in different parts of the world, as on recognition of and
trade with China,45 and can thus be only a partial answer as to why the US felt it
impossible to break with Britain in Iran. The other part of the answer lies in
American assessments of the Middle East.
The ending of the Berlin blockade and the adoption of NSC 68 shifted the focus
of US containment policy towards the Third World. The Middle East was no
exception and its growing political importance was reflected in ‘a program of
mobilization supported by economic controls, and international arrangements and
understandings which previously has never occurred in the absence of a state of
war’.46 By the spring of 1952, the US had signed technical cooperation agreements
with Saudi Arabia (17 January 1950), Jordan (3 March 1950), Iraq (19 April 1950),
and Lebanon (29 May 1950). It had begun increased aid allocations to the region
(particularly Greece, Turkey, and Iran); in August 1950 signed a treaty of friendship,
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commerce, and navigation with Israel; and later started a programme of assistance
to the newly independent constitutional monarchy in Libya. It had also secured a
mutual defence treaty with Saudi Arabia and access to the Dhahran airfield.
When it came to planning for the security of the Middle East, however, it was felt
that little could be hoped for from the Middle Eastern nations themselves, even with
a Western-backed Middle East Defence Organization. They were considered as keen
to fight each other as to fight the Soviets, and subject to weaknesses ‘too deep-seated
to permit rapid progress in the short run on an over-all regional basis’. In March
1952, the CIA concluded that: ‘For the foreseeable future, effective defense of the
Middle East against Soviet aggression is dependent upon the commitment of
Western forces for that purpose, regardless of whether a Middle East defense
organization is established or not’.47
This raised the question, which Western country should defend the Middle East?
As far as the US military was concerned, there was only one answer—Britain—and
to this they consistently held. The British had a strong tradition of military
involvement in the Middle East. The hub of British power lay in the huge Suez base
where they had first arrived during the so-called Temporary Occupation in 1882, and
by the early 1950s they had established an installation covering 200 square miles and
serving as home to more than 70,000 troops. The Royal Navy also enjoyed consider-
able influence in the area, with representation in Malta, Bahrain, Cyprus, Aden, and
the Suez Canal. The Royal Air Force, too, in addition to headquarters in Ismailia,
had established bases in Bahrain, Sharjah, Masirah, Amman, on the Shatt-el-Arab
border, and in Iraq at Habbaniya and Shaibah. In short, Britain was, without doubt,
the most powerful Western nation in the Middle East.
America’s predilection to rely upon Britain to provide for the security of the
Middle East was bolstered by the US military’s fear of over-extension. At the
Pentagon talks in 1947 it was agreed that Britain should retain primary responsi-
bility for defence of the Middle East. In December 1951 it was still felt that: ‘Under
present war plans the US forces are not available for a specific commitment to the
Middle East. Those forces which are in the general area could only offer some
support to Middle Eastern defense forces. The US therefore considers M.E. defense
a British strategic responsibility.’ Britain’s attempts to secure American assistance in
meeting its Middle Eastern obligations conspicuously failed.48 Even in the pursuit of
joint objectives, the US military vetoed involvement in the Middle East. For
example, a suggestion by Churchill in January 1952 that the US contribute to the
defence of the Suez Canal stirred a hornets’ nest in Washington; and even with
regard to the proposed Middle East Defence Organization the US ‘made it clear that
its participation does not involve any commitment of troops’.49
Such was the US military’s aversion to making any commitments to the Middle
East that it clung to British responsibility for defending the area despite increasing
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doubts as to the capacity of Britain actually to do so. The Americans knew that
British resources were desperately over-committed. Withdrawal from Greece had
been an early indication that Britain’s capabilities were unequal to its world obliga-
tions, and the political necessity of making a military commitment to Europe had
further strained its resources. Indeed, Field Marshal Slim was convinced that the
fulfilment of this commitment inevitably undermined that to the Middle East.50 As
early as 1950 the British warned that, given their capabilities, their efforts would be
concentrated on an ‘inner core’ of Middle Eastern states centred on Egypt, contrary
to developing American ideas based on a Northern Tier strategy focusing on Iran,
Pakistan, and Turkey. As George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
East and African Affairs, recalls: ‘it was a matter of deliberate policy that our Joint
Chiefs of Staff very carefully thought out to do nothing in the Middle East so that if
a vacuum occurred the British would have to attempt to fill it’.51 This would
theoretically force the British to maintain, or even increase, their military presence;
ensure that US capabilities were not diluted in areas of greater priority; and, in the
event of the Middle East being lost, avoid any explicit American responsibility. In
the worst-case scenario, Middle Eastern oil supplies could probably be denied the
Soviets by air strikes. Thus, regardless of Britain’s increasingly obvious limitations,
the US military was determined that the area remain a primary responsibility of the
UK, something regarded by Paul Nitze as a ‘Never-Never Land kind of analysis’.52
Despite fears that the British did not understand the real dangers posed by
Communism and that association with British imperialism would thwart American
attempts to harness Third World nationalism against Communism, the Americans
were not in a position of sufficient strength either to dictate British policy or to
adopt their own independent line. An independent policy presumed at best a
weakening of America’s most important Cold War ally. At worst it could involve a
severe rift in Anglo-American relations and even an American assumption of
responsibility for the Middle East. The conclusion was simple: ‘we could not afford
to achieve our objectives in Iran if we “did in” the British at the same time’.53
Conclusion
From the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis many wider conclusions can be drawn about how
the two powers sought to redefine their bilateral relations after World War II. In the
context of Iran and the Middle East, the inevitable clashes between a burgeoning
superpower bent on countering Communism and a declining power desperately
seeking to retain influence are starkly revealed. The struggle to manage Anglo-
American relations in Iran and the Middle East was more difficult than in almost
any other region. Britain was deeply established in the area and, with a status quo in
Europe and diminished influence in the Far East, HMG was convinced that to
remain a great power Britain needed to retain its Middle Eastern position. The need
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for oil intensified Britain’s determination to hold off challenges to its supremacy,
and heightened British sensitivity toward suggestions of compromise. Yet its severely
weakened economic position meant that, to retain traditional influence in the
Middle East, American support was needed. This entailed an almost impossible
management task. A reluctant US had to be involved in the Middle East; yet its
involvement must not be such as to threaten British influence. How could this be
achieved? To introduce the US to the Middle East, the Communist threat had to be
emphasized. However, when the Americans moved to counter Communism they
often overrode British interests. For example, British objectives demanded that
Britain and America be seen to stand together, but the Americans resisted an overt
Special Relationship because they feared association with British imperialism.
Similarly, the US supported against Communism the same Third World nationalism
that challenged established British interests. Moreover, the involvement of the US in
the Middle East meant the British opening traditional markets to their greatest
economic rival and, therefore, a new threat to British trade and influence. In short, if
the correct balance was not struck, the US could just as easily weaken as support
Britain’s position in the Middle East.
Iran was a case in point. The Americans’ traditional anti-imperialism predisposed
them to sympathize with Iranian aspirations. More importantly, American pre-
occupation with Communism clashed with Britain’s determination to protect its
economic interests. The US sought to harness for anti-Communism the same Iranian
nationalism which Britain tried to quell, and urged concessions on the British which
the latter deemed contrary to their national interests. Financial, political, strategic,
and military imperatives demanded that Britain reject any solution which smacked
of appeasement. Britain did not, could not, and would not share US political
priorities or assessments of the Iranian situation.
However, the fact that America did not pursue an independent policy in Iran
reveals that there was sufficient mutual dependence to safeguard the Special
Relationship. For the Americans the threat of Communism, particularly after the
Berlin Blockade, the Soviet atomic test, and NSC 68, was important in restoring a
sense of mutual need rather than domination to what was an increasingly asym-
metric Anglo-American relationship. Thereafter, common Anglo-American long-
range objectives and values facilitated broad agreement on general principles and
improved cooperation in many fields. Indeed, the problems created by the changing
balance of forces within the Special Relationship were largely mitigated by a com-
bination of consanguinity and the US need for British help with the policy of global
containment. This did, beyond any doubt, allow the British special access to, and
influence in, Washington.
Frustrated by the British attitude and fearing a second China in Iran, the
Americans seriously considered a policy independent of Britain’s. Yet, to the chagrin
of some US officials at least, they found that they could not afford to go it alone.
They were trapped in a mediatory role that they had neither the resources nor
influence to play. Britain was America’s closest and most important Cold War ally,
had the traditional influence in the Middle East to counter Communism, and was
the Western power designated the task in American grand strategy of defending Iran
and the Middle East. To adopt a unilateral policy in Iran would at best severely
undermine Britain’s capacity and willingness to fulfil more important American
needs, not least military defence of the Middle East. Thus, the larger considerations
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of the importance of the Special Relationship and an unwillingness to commit forces
to the Middle East dictated that the Americans could not break with Britain over
the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis. They concluded that ‘broad strategic considerations
limit the extent to which we may force the U.K.’s terms for the purpose of achieving
a compromise on the oil question. As one person put it, “there is no plan (for
resolving the oil question) which we can afford to put forward which the British
would not accept.”’54
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